1955-04-01 by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1956
1955-04-01
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Arthur H. Nielsen; Wendell B. Hammond; George Fadel; Attorneys for Appellant;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Co., No. 8430 (Utah Supreme Court, 1956).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2467
f!C 11 
================~uw ut~: 
• l.ot 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
...,_. ·r·· v "'; . . 
~ ... _ • .-til 
J. WILLIAM RANDALL, - ;:;e;·!- .. ,r . 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
TRACY COLLINS TRUST COMPANY, 
Executor of the Estate of SARAH P. 
RANDALL BRERETON, Deceased, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Appellant's Brief 
Civil No. 
8430 
ARTHUR H. NIELSEN 
510 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
WENDELL B. HAMMOND 
Bountiful, Utah 
GEORGE FADEL 
Bountiful, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF FACTS .......................................................................... 1 
STATEMENT OF POINTS........................................................................ 8 
ARGUMENT ................................................................................................ 10 
I THE PLEADINGS AND EVIDENCE ARE INSUFFI-
CIENT TO JUSTIFY A FINDING OF AN AGREE-
MENT BETWEEN DECEDENT AND PLAINTIFF .......... 10 
II THE PLEADINGS AND EVIDENCE REQUIRE THE 
FINDING THAT ANY SUCH PURPORTED AGREE-
MENT WAS WITHIN THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
AND UNENFORCEABLE ........................................................ 33 
III THE COURT ERRED IN CERTAIN RULINGS ON THE 
EVIDENCE ...................................................................................... 37 
IV THE COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING THE MATTER 
TO THE JURY AND IN FOLLOWING ITS D~TER-
MINATION OF THE FACTS ...................................................... 43 
CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 47 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
(Cases) 
Andrews v. Aiken, 44 Idaho 797, 260 P. 423, 69 A.L.R. 14 ........ 24, 29,34 
Brinton v. Van Cott, 8 Utah 480, 33 P. 218 ........................................ 27, 34 
Burton v. McLaughlin, (1950) 117 Utah 483, 217 Pac. 2d 566 ........ 36, 42 
City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 31 Cal., 
2d 227, 231 Pac. 2d 26, 25 A.L.R. 2d 1418 ...................................... 41 
Clark v. Clark, 74 Ut. 290, 279 P. 502 ...................................................... 23 
Clark v. George, 120 Utah 350, 234 P. 2d 844 .................................... 23, 34 
Collins v. Collins, 110 Ohio St. 105, 143 N.E. 561.. ................................ 42 
Ehling v. Diebert (N. J.) 15 Atl. 2d 655 .................................................. 28 
Grady v. Faison, 224 N.C. 567, 31 S.E. 2d 760 ...................................... 34 
Hargreaves v. Burton, 59 Ut. 575, 206 P. 262 ........................................ 21 
Holsz v. Stephen, 362 Ill. 527, 200 N.E. 601.. ........................................ 36 
In Re Bayer, 116 Neb. 670, 218 N.W. 746 .............................................. 42 
Jamerson v. Logan, 228 N.C. 540, 46 S.E. 2d 661 .................................. 34 
Lake Shore Duck Club v. Lake View Duck Club, 50 Utah 76, 
166 Pac. 309 ............................................................................................ 10 
Mangan's Will, 185 Wis. 328, 200 N.W. 386 ............................................ 42 
Olsen v. Dixon, 165 Minn. 124, 205 N.W. 956 .......................................... 28 
Price v. Lloyd, 31 Ut. 86, 86 P. 767 .......................................................... 20 
Startin v. Madsen (1951), 120 Utah 631, 237 P. 2d 834 ...................... 35 
STATUTES CITED 
Section 25-5-3 U .C.A. 1953 .................................................................. ~..... 33 
Section 78-24-8 (2) U.C.A. 1953 ................................................................ 41 
MISCELLANEOUS 
49 Am. Jur. Statute of Frauds, Sec. 216 ................................................ 33 
69 A.L.R. p. 14 ................................................ -................................................ 24 
69 A.L.R. p. 145............................................................................................ 30 
69 A.L.R. p. 167............................................................................................ 48 
106 A.L.R. 742 ................................................................................................ 25 
15 A.L.R. 2d 1325.......................................................................................... 34 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME CO·UR T 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
J. vVILLIAM RANDALL, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
TRACY COLLINS TRUST COMPANY, 
Executor of the Estate of SARAH P. 
RANDALL BRERETON, Deceased, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Appellant's Brief 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Civil No. 
8430 
This is an appeal taken by Tracy Collins Trust Com-
pany as Executor of the Estate of Sarah P. Randall 
Brereton, deceased, from a J udg1nent and Decree entered 
by the Honorable vVilliam Stanley Dunford, Judge of 
the District Court of Utah County, on the 6th day of 
July, 1955, and from the order of the Court denying 
Appellant's J\fotion for a new Trial dated September 8th, 
1955. 
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The action w.as originally comin_enced by Respon-
dent on October 29, 1954, claiming that at some time 
between April 1, 1946 and September 1, 1946 Sarah P. 
Randall Brereton, now deceased, "proposed to Plain-
tiff that if he would leave his business in Ogden, Utah, 
dispose of his home and move his family to Provo, and 
become an employee of the State B.ank of Provo, of 
which deceased owned stock control, and devote his time 
and attention to the personal and financial affairs of 
deceased and to her welfare, during the remainder of 
her lifetime, she would, in consideration of such acts 
and services on the p.art of Plaintiff, leave to him by 
Last Will and Testament all her stock in the said State 
Bank of Provo which she should own at the time of 
her death, together with her residence in Provo, Utah." 
The Complaint further alleges that Plaintiff agreed 
with decedent that he would undertake and perforn1 such 
obligation and services; that he did so; and that not-
withstanding the decedent did, pursuant to said agree-
rnent, leave Plaintiff said bank stock and residence, said 
decedent thereafter on or about October :23. 1951 in 
violation of said contract "perfonned and being per-
formed hy Plaintiff" changed her \Yill and left s.aid 
bank stock to one Ross Richards. 
The answer of the Defendant set up the defense that 
the complaint failed to state a clailn upon which relief 
could be granted and in any event denied the existence 
of any agremnent or that Plaintiff had perforn1ed any 
agree1nent entitling hin1 to recover. Defendant further 
pleaded the Statute of ":"ills and the Statute of Frauds. 
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The Court never fonnally ruled upon the defense that 
the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief 
could be granted. 
Upon request of the Plaintiff, .and over objection 
of the Defendant, the Court set the cause down for 
jury trial, stating that "there see1ns to be so n1uch of 
fact involved in the presentation and disproof of the 
claimed agreement and the compliance or noncompliance 
therewith that it felt the jury could give the Court con-
siderable assistance." (R.p. 36) (Reference is made to 
this matter specifically for the reason that it evidences 
the apparent attitude of the Court throughout this case 
that the actual burden was upon the Defendant to dis-
prove the existance of the agreement rather than upon 
the Plaintiff to prove the existance thereof). 
The decedent Sarah P. Randall Brereton, w.as 95 
years old at the time of her death on June 4, 1954. 
She, and her husband before her, had been the chief 
stockholder and directing officer of the State Bank of 
Provo. :Mr. Brereton died in November, 1938, and there.,. 
after Mrs. Brereton took an active part in the admini-
stration of the affairs of the bank until a short time 
prior to her death. 
Apparently the first Will which Mrs. Brereton exe-
cuted was shortly after her husband's death. On April 
22, 1940 she executed a Will which, after providing for 
various specific bequests, willed to Plaintiff J. William 
Randall, Ross Richards, and Tracy Collins Trust Com-
pany as Trustees, 126 shares of the c.apital stock of the 
State Bank of Provo with authority vested in said 
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Trustees to vote during the term of the trust. The 
trust was to continue for a period of ten ( 10) years 
following Mrs. Brereton's death, or until the death of 
the Plaintiff, J. Willaim Randall, or until the stock was 
sold by the Trustees, whichever event occured first. The 
income from the stock, under the terms of the trust, 
was to be paid to the Plaintiff during the period of 
the trust. Upon the expiration of ten (10) years, or 
upon the sale of the stock by the Trustees, the rest of 
the trust was to become the property of J.Ir. Randall 
absolute. But if Plaintiff died during the trust, then 
the property was to be sold and the proceeds distributed 
to his children, share and share alike. 
The will further had a residuary clause hy which all 
of the "rest and residue" of decedent's property "\Vas to 
go to the Plaintiff, "outright and absolute", or to his 
children in the event Plaintiff did not survive the 
testator. 
This Will re1nained in effect without change until 
June 24, 1941, when testatrix executed a codicil which 
changed some of the specific bequeaths. Again, on Octo-
ber 21, 1941, Mrs. Brereton made a second codicil which, 
among other things, changed the provision of the \Yill 
with respect to Plaintiff's participation therein by pro-
viding that in the event Plaintiff died prior to testatrix, 
or during the existance of the trust, the bank stock 
would be divided anwng 1-! nmued relatives, incluing 
Ross Richards. On l\Iay 7, 19-!6, :Mrs. Brereton executed 
a third codicil in which she cancelled .all provisions 
relating to the trust and any benefits to be derived 
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therefron1 in favor of the Plaintiff and his heirs. The 
effect of this change was to throw the bank stock into the 
residuary clause of the \Yill which remained unchanged 
and which bequeathed .all the rest and residue of said 
property to the Plaintiff. 
In the fall of 1946, the Plaintiff, J. William Randall, 
left Ogden, Utah and went to Provo where he began to 
work full time in the bank. Prior to that time, and 
from about 1940 on, :Mr. Randall had been a director 
in the bank and participated in the directors' meetings. 
When he first came down in 1946, he becmne what ht· 
termed hin1self as "Active Vice-President," although he 
had been Vice-President for son1e ti1ne prior thereto. 
(Tr. 102). Later in 1946, he bought a home in Provo and 
subsequently 1noved his family down, and they have since 
lived in Provo. 
Mrs. Brereton's Will remained unchanged from May 
7, 1946, until October 23, 1951 when she executed her 
fourth codicil by which she specifically left to Plain-
tiff her h01ne, furniture, fixtures, and equip1nent, and 
changed the residuary clause therein so as to make Ros~ 
Richards her legatee. She died on June 4, 1954, approxi-
mately two years and nine months later without further 
change in the Will. 
Upon the Will being admitted to probate, Plain-
tiff herein commenced this action alleging an oral agree-
ment between the Decedent and the Plaintiff as above set 
forth and requesting the Court to require the Tracy 
Collins Trust Company .as Executor of the Will specifi--
cally to perform such oral agreement. Plaintiff also filed 
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objections to the admitting of the Will to probate, con-
testing the fourth codicil upon the grounds .and for the 
reasons that the decedent "was continuously not of sound 
and disposing mind because of decedent's advanced .age, 
and that said decedent was therefore incapable, because 
of unsoundness of mind, of making a codicil to her Last 
\Vill and Testament." Plaintiff further alleged that the 
beneficiary to said fourth codicil, Ross Richards, con-
trolled and influenced the mind and action of decedent 
"to the extent that the said Ross Richards did succeed 
in substituting his will for the will of said decedent, 
and that at the time of the execution of the document 
dated October 23, 1951, purporting to be a fourth codicil 
to her Last \Vill and Testament, decedent was not fol-
lowing the dictates of her own will, but was acting 
wholly under the influence of said Ross Richards and 
that said purported fourth codicil was not the free and 
voluntary .act of decedent, but it was solely the result 
of the undue influence of said Ross Richards." (See, 
Probate File No. 10915, adn1itted in evidence). 
The Will contest action is now pending in the 
District Court and has not yet been heard. (The very 
fact that Plaintiff herein has filed an action attempting 
to set aside the last codicil of decedenfs \Viii indicates 
the weakness of his position in this action, purporting 
to elailn a verbal agree1nent between hin1 and the dece-
dent, whereby decedent allegedly agreed to leave Plain-
tiff her property.) 
The Trial Court held a pre-trial at which two issues 
of fact wen• fr.mned for detenuination as follows: 
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"1. On or about the last of April, 1946, did 
decedent and the Plaintiff enter into an agree-
ment whereby the decedent agreed that in con-
sideration of Plaintiffs leaving his business in 
Ogden, selling his home and moving his family to 
Provo and becoming an employee of the State 
Bank of Provo, in which bank decedent owned the 
controlling interest, .and would thereafter devote 
his time and attention to the personal and finan-
cial affairs of decedent and her welfare during the 
remainder of her lifetime, that she would leave 
to him by her Last Will and Testament all of 
her stock in said State Bank of Provo, consti-
tuting a controlling interest therein, and the home 
which she then owned, being the property 
described in paragraph 3 of the Plaintiff's com-
plaint~ 
"2. If so, has the agreement been performed 
by the Plaintiff f' 
In addition to the above issues of fact the Court 
framed three issues of law as follows: 
"1. If any .agreement, as claimed by Plain-
tiff, was made, was such agreement in violation 
of the Statute of Frauds 1 
"2. If any agreement, as claimed by Plain-
tiff, was made, was such agreement in violation of 
the Statute of Wills? 
"3. If .any agreement, as claimed by Plain-
tiff, was made, was legal consideration given for 
the agreement?" 
Over the objection of the Defendant, the Court 
placed the matter on the jury calendar for trial, which 
commenced on }farch 21, 1955. Following the conclusion 
of the evidence the n1atter was submitted to the jury 
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upon special interrogatories which were found in favor 
of the Plaintiff .and against the Defendant. Thereafter 
the court set the matter down for argu1nent by counsel, 
which argument was held in June, 1955. Subsequently 
the Court on the 24th of June rendered a memorandum 
decision in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defen-
dant. On July 6th Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and Judgment were filed; and thereafter on July 14th 
defendant filed .a motion to amend the Findings, Con-
clusions and Judgment and also filed a motion for New 
Trial. After hearing the arguments of counsel on the 
foregoing 1natters the Court on September 8, 1955, modi-
fied its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
having so n1odified the Findings denied Defendant's 
motion to mnend and for a New Trial. Thereafter, within 
the ti1ne required, the Defendant took this appeal. 
STA_TE1IEXT OF POIXTS 
Appellant relies upon the following propositions for 
reversal of the Judgment of the Trial Court: 
1. The pleadings are insufficient to set forth any 
right to relief by way of specific perfonnance. 
2. The evidence is insufficient to justify any 
Finding that an Agree1nent existed. 
3. The evidence is insufficient to show that the 
Plaintiff fulfilled the tern1s of any purported ~'-greeinent. 
.f. The evidence conclusively shows that Plaintiff 
could be, and was, con1pensated fully for any services 
rendered by hiln for decedent. 
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5. The Court erred in refusing to allow the intro-
duction of evidence relating to Plaintiff's income before 
and after he cmne to Provo and began working at the 
Bank. 
6. The Court erred in adrnitting testimony of the 
witness, Clyde Sandgren, who was decedent's .attorney, 
of conversations between hi1nself and decedent. 
7. The Court erred in submitting the n1atter to tlw 
jury and in its instructions on the effect to be given 
to the evidence by the jury. 
8. The trial court erred 111 following the verdict 
of the jury and in entering Judgment in favor of th~.:~ 
Plaintiff and against the Defendant. 
For convenience of the Supreme Court in reviewin~ 
the case, the foregoing points have been consolidated 
into the following propositions for discussion and argu-
ment in the Brief: 
POINT I 
THE PLEADINGS AND EVIDENCE ARE INSUFFI-
CIENT TO JUSTIFY A FINDING OF AN AGREEMENT 
BETWEEN DECEDENT AND PLAINTIFF. 
POINT II 
THE PLEADINGS AND EVIDENCE REQUIRE THE 
FINDING THAT ANY SUCH PURPORTED AGREEMENT 
WAS WITHIN THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS AND UNEN-
FORCEABLE. 
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN CERTAIN RULINGS ON THE 
EVIDENCE. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING THE MATTER 
TO THE JURY AND IN FOLLOWING ITS DETERMINATION 
OF THE FACTS. 
ARGUl\IENT 
POINT I 
THE PLEADINGS AND EVIDENCE ARE INSUFFI-
CIENT TO JUSTIFY A FINDING OF AN AGREEMENT 
BETWEEN DECEDENT AND PLAINTIFF. 
At the outset we wish to point out that this being 
an equity case, this Court will review all of the facts 
to determine if there is substantial evidence to support 
the decision of the lower Court. Lake Shore Duck Club 
v. Lake View D1.tck Club, 50 Utah 76, 166 Pac. 309. There 
this Court said that in an equity case the court would 
"review the testilnony for the purpose of detennining 
what the facts are and the equities of the parties, even 
though its views are in conflict with the findings of 
the trial court." 
The basis of Plaintiff's cl.ain1 is set out in paragraph 
2 of the Complaint to the effect that Decedent ""proposed 
to Plaintiff that if he would leaye his businesf' in Ogden, 
Utah, dispose of his hmue and 1uove with his fa1nily to 
Provo, and becmne an e1nployee of State Bank of Provo, 
of which deceased owned stock control, and devote his 
time and attention to the personal .and financial affairs 
10 
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of deceased and to her welfare, during the remainder 
of her lifetilne, she would, in consideration of such acts 
and services on the part of Plaintiff, leave to him by 
Last "'\Vill and Testarnent all her stock in the said State 
B.ank of Provo which she should own at the time of 
her death, together with her residence in Provo, Utah; 
Plaintiff agreed with Decedent that he would undertake 
and perform such obligations and services, and shortly 
thereafter, and as expeditiously as possible, sold his 
Ogden horne and moved to Provo, and during the re-
mainder of the lifetirne of Decedent, cared for her aw{ 
her .affairs, both personal and financial and became and 
continued an mnployee of said State Bank of Provo. 
(R. p. 4) 
In its arnended Findings the Court found: 
"1. That between April 1 and September 
1, 1946, Plaintiff and Sarah P. Randall Brereton 
entered into an oral agreement by the terms of 
which the said Sarah P. Randall agreed that if 
Plaintiff would sell his home and leave his busi-
ness in Ogden, Utah, move with his family to 
Provo, Utah, become an employee of the State 
Bank of Provo and would devote his time, talents, 
energy and attention during her lifetime to caring 
for her business and financial affairs, particu-
larly her bank, giving advice and counsel in 
respect to other matters and caring for her per-
sonal affairs such as rendering her personal ser-
vices, care and :attention, caring for her home, 
furnishing her companionship, meals, protection 
during illness and the maintenance of her home 
and grounds in an efficient operating condition, 
that upon her death she would leave to him by 
her Will her home in Provo and her stock con-
11 
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stituting controlling interest in the State Bank of 
Provo." (R. 60-62) 
The findings go beyond what is clailned in the 
Complaint in .an attempt to set out a sufficient agree-
Inent to justify the Court in ordering its performance. 
Yet, as will be seen hereinafter, there is no testimony 
in the record that in any way would indicate that Plain-
tiff rendered decedent "personal services, care and atten-
tion, caring for her home, furnishing her companionship, 
1neals, protection during illness," because of any con-
tractual obligation. Certainly the 1nere fact that some 
such services were rendered is no evidence of a contract 
to perform then1. 
In the beginning, the cmnplaint does not set out, 
as a part of the alleged agreen1ent between Plaintiff 
and Decedent, .any specific acts ·which the Plaintiff was 
to perform except to 1nove from Ogden, Utah, to Provo, 
to become an employee of the bank, and devote his 
time and attention to the personal and financial affair~ 
of deceased and to her welfare. Obviously it would be 
in1possible for Plaintiff to undertake einployJ.nent .at 
Provo, Utah at the bank unless he sold his hmne in 
Ogden and 1noved to Provo. Likewise, since :Jirs. 
Brereton's financial inten·~ts were tied up with the 
hank, the attention the Plaintiff n1ight giYc to the bank 
affairs would, in all probability, inure to the benefit of 
~Irs. Brereton financially-at least if such actiYitie~ 
were profitable. However, the cmnplaint in no 'vay 
claims any purported agremnent whereby Plaintiff wa~ 
to render to the decedent personal ~eJTice, care and 
attention, caring for her honw, furnishing her cmnpany, 
12 
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111eals, protection during illness and the maintenance of 
her home and grounds in an efficient operating con-
dition. Yet that is what the court found was the Agree-
lnent in its an1ended Findings set forth above. The only 
allegation in the complaint relating to an agree1nent 
was that such .agreement related to personal and finan-
cial affairs. 
Insofar a:-> the evidence is concerned, there is very 
little, if any, competent and 1naterial testin1ony that 
any agreement at all was made between the parties. 
The witness l\1:ildred Brereton, a niece of the decedent 
testified over the objection of counsel for Defendant, 
that in the spring of 1939, decedent told the witness 
that if the latter would live with decedent and take care 
of her during the re1nainder of her life, decedent would 
give the witness what property she had. (Tr. 13) 
Although the foregoing is so remote in time that counsel 
objected to it on the grounds that it was both ilnmaterial 
and irrelevant, it further does not in any way tend to 
establish any agreement between decedent and the Plain-
tiff herein. As a matter of fact, the proposition if made 
by decedent to the witness, appears to have required 
the witness to stay with decedent and take care of her. 
There is no claim by Plaintiff that he stayed with 
decedent or that he personally took care of her, the 
evidence being that decedent had a special housekeeper 
or nurse during her declining years. (Tr. 32,33) 
Subsequently, in the fall of 1939, the witness testi-
fied that decedent asked to be driven to Ogden to see 
the Plaintiff stating that she was "going up to see 
13 
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if she could make any arrangements to get \Yill Randall 
to come down and take over her personal and business 
affairs. She said she needed someone she could trust 
and who had the ability and understood the banking 
and lumber business." (Tr. 16) 
Again, if this testimony is 1naterial for any purpose 
it relates only to a business relationship to be established 
between the parties and not to any relationship involving 
fili.al service, affection, compaionship, or association. 
Even the final conclusion of the witness' testimony to 
the effect that when she was advised by decedent that 
~fr. Randall was coming to Provo decedent said, "she 
had worked out an agree1nent with \Viii whereby he 
would come down and take over the bank" ; and also 
that "he w.as to take over her personal affairs and also 
at that time the lumber yard," (Tr. 22) involves nothing 
more than a business relationship for assistance to dece-
dent in managing her financial matters. Counsel for the 
Plaintiff indulged in considerable leading and suggestive 
questions which were objected to; but even his questions 
did not suggest any agree1nent of personal coinpanion-
ship, care, affection and association. I quote fron1 the 
Transcript, pages 22, 23 as follows: 
"Q. (Continuing) I asked you if she said 
what Will was to get in return for the duties he 
was to perform for her and at the bank? 
"A. She said he was to get the hank stock 
and her home." 
Other witnesses relied upon by Plaintiff to show 
an agree1nent were l\fr. :Money and :\Ir. Charles Dickson, 
14 
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who were banker friends of the Plaintiff, residing in 
Spanish Fork, Utah. They testified they had been inter-
ested in acquiring decedent's stock in the State Bank 
of Provo. Mr. ~Ioney testified that Mrs. Brereton "made 
the statement that she had turned her interest over to 
Will Randall, and that he was coming down to take 
care of her banking interest and also her." (Tr. 39). 
On redirect exan1ination, and upon a leading question 
being asked by Plaintiff's counsel, the witness testified, 
"She gave us to understand very definitely that she 
had made a deal with Randall and turned her interests 
over to hi1n and he was coming down to operate her 
interests." (Tr. 40) 
Mr. Dickson's testimony was to the affect that 
decedent stated "that Will was coming down to take over 
her interests in the hank, that a deal had been made 
with him for that purpose." 
"Q. Did she say what Will was supposed 
to do~" 
"A. No, I don't know that she detailed his 
duties, but she said that he was coming down; 
a deal had been made with him; that she wasn't 
interested in selling her bank stock; that .a deal 
had been made with him and that she wasn't 
interested in selling." (Tr. 43) 
On cross-examination :Mr. Dickson could not tell 
when the purported conversation took place, nor as to 
any more details thereof. 
The testimony of Mr. Money and Mr. Dickson might 
well be read in the light of the testimony of Clyde 
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Sandgren, an attorney. ~Ir. Sandgren's testimony was 
objected to as being privileged, and that 1natter will be 
discussed hereinafter. However, even conceding for the 
moment that his testimony was properly admitted, it 
shows only an intention to give to Plaintiff sufficient 
stock to control the bank-not in consideration of per-
sonal services to be performed, but by way of an induce-
ment to get him to come to Provo and look after her 
interests at the bank. ~fr. Sandgren testified: 
"Q. Would you state what she said to you 
with respect to her agreement with Will Randall~ 
"A. She said that she had asked :\Ir. Randall 
to come to Provo to look after her interests at 
the bank, and as an inducement, had promised to 
leave him the controlling interest in the bank, 
through her will. She stated she had directed that 
126 shares out of the 150 owned by her be given 
to Mr. Randall. 
"Q. That is the substance of it~ 
"A. That is the substance of it." (Tr. 81) 
In response to further interrogation by Plaintiff's 
counsel as to what if any personal sen-ices :\Lr. Randall 
\Yas to perfor1n, the witness testified: 
"Q. Did she say anything to you about what 
Mr. Randall had done for her personally, or any-
thing of that sort! 
"A. No, she did not." (Tr. 81) 
On cross exmnination ::\Ir. SandgrPn indentified 
Exhibit A, which was rt'ePiYed in evidence, as a letter 
decedent had requested ~lr. Sandgren to prepare and 
send to rl1 raey-Collins Trust Cmnpany in connection with 
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her Will, which .at that time left to the Plaintiff all of 
her bank stock under the residuary clause thereof. This 
letter said nothing about any agreement between dece-
dent and the Plaintiff, As a matter of fact, the reference 
to Plaintiff therein is in complete harmony with the 
terms of her vVill as it then existed to the effect it 
was "my intent that 1ny nephew, J. \Vill R.andall, receiv•_• 
under my will a sufficient number of shares of State 
Bank stock to give him, together with the shares already 
owned hy him, a margin of control." (Tr. 82, 83) 
The witness further testified: 
"Q. She said nothing about what her future 
intent might be, at any time in the future, but 
only that that was her intent so far as her pres-
ent intent and thinking was concerned, isn't that 
right~ 
"A. I don't know that she ever projected 
herself into the future as to what she might want 
to do. 
"Q. As far as you personally were con-
cerned, you knew that a person legally could 
change their will at .any time they so desired~ 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. She indicated at that time that she 
wanted to know that Will would get the control 
if she died. That is right, isn't it~ 
"A. That is right." 
The foregoing testimony of l\fr. Sandgren, if con-
sidered admissab1P, and Mr. Money and l\fr. Dickson 
would indicate that any agreernent between decedent and 
Plaintiff related only to the hank stock and then only 
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as an inducement to get Plaintiff to come into the 
bank and manage the same, for which service Plaintiff 
was otherwise sufficiently compensated by s.alary. 
The only significant statement the witness, !frs . 
• J. A. Zenger Inade was that when she commented to 
the decedent that the latter was fortunate to have such 
attentive niece and nephew-in-law, decedent stated "th.at 
she felt she had it coming to her because the Randalls 
were going to be taken care of." This state1nent, con-
trary to showing any agreen1ent between decedent and 
plaintiff, would indicate that no agreement existed; that 
plaintiff was going to be provided for by \Vill-not 
because of any legal obligation on the part of decedent 
but because decedent at that time desired her nephew 
to be the recipient of her bounty. As will hereinafter 
be demonstrated, plaintiff did receive considerable finan-
cial assistance from decedent during her life time and 
was to receive considerable frmn her under the terms 
of her Will. 
l\[r. William W. Brereton, great-nephew of decedent 
and husband of the witness, :.Jlildred Brereton, testified 
on direct examination by leading and suggestive ques-
tions on the part of plaintiff's counsel that, 
•• A. I can't recall the exact date or the year, 
but she mentioned on more than one occasion 
that Will was supposed to get her bank stock 
and her home. 
"Q. Did she characterize it as an agree1nent, 
or a deal? 
"A. It was an agreement between her and 
Will. 
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"Q. What was Will to do in exchange for 
it? 
"A. He was to come down and take care 
of her and her business or her affairs. 
"Q. And her, is that right~ 
"A. And her. 
'"Q. Did she say what he was supposed to 
do in taking care of her~ 
"A. Supposed to take care of the house and 
grounds ; the furnace and the home, and take 
care of her business." (Tr. 60, 61) 
However, on cross exmnination this same witness 
admitted that previously in his deposition he had testi-
fied differently, as follo·ws, 
"Well, she told me more than once that Will 
was to get what she had. Now what it was, I 
don't know for sure. It might have been every-
thing, but I imagine that was it, because when 
she said he was to get it all, what would you 
say? .... 
"Q. And that is as you remember what she 
said, is that right? 
"A. (Witness nods head.)" (Tr. 63) 
He further admitted on cross examination that at 
the time of the taking of his deposition he had stated 
that decedent had told hiln "\Viii was to get her estate 
and that Will was to "take care of the bank and her 
business"; that that was all he remen1bered of the con-
versation. (Tr. 64) 
It is significant that Jvir. Brereton was not present 
during testimony of his wife and the plaintiff at the 
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time of taking the depositions, while he \vas present 
during the giving of the testirrwny by his wife at the 
trial. (Tr. 65) In trying to explain why he did not men-
tion taking care of the home .at the deposition the wit-
ness said that speaking of taking care of the bank and 
decedent's business he thought, would include the home. 
(Tr. 65) IIe also stated that he had been a director in 
the bank and had worked closely with plaintiff for 
sever.al years ; that he had talked to plaintiff several 
tirnes about this case, particularly one occasion prior 
to the death of ~1rs. Brereton when he knew that some-
thing wasn't just right. (Tr. 66) 
\Ve submit that :J[r. Brereton's testimony is so 
vague, uncertain, and contradictory that it is worthy of 
no consideration. I-Ie testified on one occasion that plain-
tiff w.as to get everything decedent had and then on 
another occasion that he was to get the bank and home . 
. He testified further that plaintiff was only to take care 
of decedent's bank and business and on another occasion, 
bank, business and hmne. 
Such testinwy, .and indeed all of the te0tin1ony in 
this case, falls far short of the require1uent laid down 
by this Court and other courts to the effect that before 
a party ean obtain specifir perfor1uanre of a parole 
agreen1ent to ronvey land the agreen1ent. and each .and 
every tenn thereof, n1ust be proved by clear, convincing 
and unequivcal Pvidenre. 
In the case of PricP r. Lloyd, 31 Utah 86 P. 7GI. 
the court "·as confronted with a clailn on the part of 
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the Plaintiff that she was a niece of the decedent and 
had married his son; that decedent promised Plaintiff 
to give her the real property, which she occupied during 
the latter part of the deceased lifetime, in consideration 
that Plaintiff would "continue to attend to his wants 
and .assist him." The Lower Court found in favor of the 
Plaintiff and against the Defendant. Ilowever, on appeal 
the judgment of the lower court was reversed, the 
Supreme Court stating among other things that 
"the contract must also be complete and certain 
in its terms; and that 'this element of complete-
ness must exist in every contract which can be 
specifically e~forced, whatever be its external 
form, whether written or verbal, whether em-
bodied in memorandum required by the statute 
of frauds, or render obligatory by p.art perfor-
mance, or by any other act which may obviate 
the prohibition of that statute.' Pomeroy, Section 
145." 
This doctrine was later re-affirmed in the case of 
Hargreaves v. Burton, 59 Utah 575, 206 P. 262, where 
the Court held 
"In Price v. Lloyd, 31 Ut., 86, 86 P. 767, 8 
I.R.A. (N.S.) 870, which was an action for the 
specific performance of a parol agreement or gift 
of land, the court held that the contract must be 
complete and certain in its terms. In spport of 
this proposition the court, at page 97 of 31 Utah, 
at page 770 of 86 P. quotes with approval the 
following excerpt from Pomeroy on Specific Per-
formance of Contracts (2d Ed.) Sec. 145. 
" .... In the beginning of the section referred 
to the same author says : 
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'It is elementary doctrine of the courts 
of equity that they will not specifically 
enforce any contract unless it is complete 
and certain.' 
"The following authorities cited by appellant 
are to the same effect: Beall et al. v. Clark, 71 
Ga. 818; Allen v. Webb, 64 Ill. 342; Rogers Loco-
motive & Mach. Works v. Helm, 154 U.S. 610, 
14 Sup. Ct. 1177, 22 L. Ed. 562; Pike v. Pettus, 
71 Ala. 98; Langston v. Bates, 84 Ill. 542, 25 Am. 
Rep. 466; 13 C. J. 263. See also, Quinn v. Daly, 
300 Ill. 273, 133 N.E. 290, in which it is said: 
'A contract will not be enforced unless 
the terms are clear, certain and unambig-
uous.' 
"-and :Marti v. Ludeking (Iowa) 185 N.W. 476, 
wherein the court says : 
'Contracts to be specifically enforced must 
be so certain and definite in their terms 
as to leave nothing to conjecture or to be 
supplied by the court, and they must be 
mutual.' 
"See, also, Albia Light & Railway Co. v. Gold 
Goose Coal & :h1ining Co. (Iowa) 185 N.,Y. 571. 
"In C. J. supra, it is said: 
'In order that there may be an agree-
ment, the parties must haYe a distinct 
intention comn1on to both and w·ithout 
doubt or difference. Until all understand 
alike, there can be no a·ssent, and there-
fore no contract. Both parties 1nust assent 
to the same thing in the smne sense, and 
their 1ninds 1nust 1neet as to all the tenus."' 
Not only 1nust the ter1ns of the contract be complete 
.and certain but also such ter1ns 11m:_;;t be proved by clear 
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and convincing evidence. See Clark v. Clark, 74 Utah 
290, 279 P. 502; Clark v. George 120 Utah 350, 234 P. 
2d. 8-±-!. 
In the latter case the Court reviewed prior cases 
decided on this point and held: 
"This court has repeatedly insisted upon the 
necessity of definiteness in the provisions of oral 
contracts for the conveyance of .land in considera-
tion for care and attention by a member of the 
family of the promiser. Price v. Lloyd, 31 Utah 
86, 86 P. 767, 8 L.R.A.N.S., 870; Montgomery v. 
Berrett, 40 Utah 385, 121 P. 569; Van Natta v. 
Heywood, 57 Utah 367, 195 P. 192; Clark v. Clark, 
74 Utah 290, 279 P. 502. In this case, the Plaintiff's 
evidence is that the little house was to be theirs, 
whether by deed or by will or in what fashion 
or at what time is not mentioned. The defendant 
denies ever writing the letter to the Plaintiff, 
offering to give them the little house and testi-
fied that he permitted them to move into it be-
cause they had no place to live . . . . we do not 
disagree with the trial court's findings: 'The 
court specifically finds that there never has at 
any time been any contract between the plaintiff 
and the defendants, or either of them, nor with 
Margaret Ann George during her lifetime, for 
the conveyance of real estate herein before 
described, or any part thereof, or any of the 
improvements thereon, and all the allegations of 
plaintiff's complaint to the effect that there were 
contracts for the conveyance of said property 
to be untrue, because of the insufficiency of the 
evidence' .... The rule is stated in Clark v. 
Clark, supra, that the plaintiff, in declaring speci-
fic performance of an oral contract must establish 
the terms thereof with a greater degree of cer-
tainty than is required in an action at law, and 
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he must show a clear mutual understanding and 
a positive agreement of both parties to the terms 
of the contract.'" (Italics added) 
A very good annotation on the subject of com-
pelling specific performance of an oral contract to con-
vey real property is found in 69 A.L.R. Pages 14 to 
214, in connection with the case of Andreu:s v. Aiken, 
44 Idaho 797, 260 P. 423. Pages 48 to 57 of this anno-
tation deals with the requisite as to certainty of the 
terms of the contract. As stated therein: 
" .... a court of equity is never anxious to gr.asp 
at slight circumstances to rescue it from the 
operation of the statute, nor does it indulge in 
any latitude of construction if there is any equivo-
cation or uncertainty in the case presented. It 
adopts the rule that the contract should be clear 
and definite, and that the acts done should be 
equally clear and definite and solely with a view 
to the performance of the particular agreement. 
If the language employed leaves the intention of 
the parties who executed the contract in doubt, 
or if there is uncertainty in regard to what 'Yas 
intended, a court of equity will not undertake to 
decree a specific performance. The minds of the 
parties must meet. The testator must understand 
that he is not merely promising to do something 
in the future, but is doing it now; that he is 
relinquishing his righ-t to change his mind. The 
parties must express the1nselves in such terms 
that their intention can be ascertained to .a 
reasonable degree of certainty; and, if the agree-
ment is so vague and indefinite that it is not 
possible to collect the full intention of the parties, 
it is not enforceable in equity. Neither the court 
nor the jury can make an .agreement for the 
parties." (Italics added) 
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See also, a supple1nental annotation in 106 A.L.R. 
742. 
Certainly the testimony delineated above does not 
establish by the clear, convincing, and unequivoc.al stan-
dards the specific tern1s of any contract. Was the Plain-
tiff to receive the bank stock and home of decedent or was 
he to receive all of her property? Did decedent under-
stand that she was not merely promising to do some-
thing in the future but that she w.as promising specifically 
to do something now, relinquishing her right subse-
quently to change her mind if she so desired? Was the 
Plaintiff n1oving from Ogden to Provo to take a job in 
the bank for his own financial and pecuniary benefit 
or for the financial and pecuniary benefit of decedent~ 
There is no testimony at all in this c.ase that Plaintiff 
was obligated by any agreement to provide the filial 
service, affection, companionship, and society which is 
necessary to invoke the power of a court in equity to 
compel specific performance. 
Assume, however, for the n1oment that there is 
evidence that a contract existed requiring the Plaintiff 
to take c.are of Plaintiff's personal and financial affairs. 
There is no evidence in the record which would support 
a finding that Plaintiff did in fact take care of such 
personal and financial affairs. Reference was made by 
Mrs. Mildred Brereton that decedent stated she wanted 
someone to handle her affairs in the lumber business. 
( Tr. 16, 22, 30) There is no testimony in this record 
that Plaintiff did anything to assist decedent in this 
matter. The evidence, likewise, shows that decedent had 
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other financial interests, but nothing the Plaintiff did 
would indicate a 1nanagement of these affairs for dece-
dent. 
It is true there is testimony that Plaintiff ,and mem-
bers of his family gave attention to the decedent by 
furnishing her meals, caring for her lawn and grounds, 
and showing her personal attention. There was no claim 
that these acts constituted the basis of the agreement. 
Nor could the Plaintiff prove an agreement between 
hin1 and decedent by showing certain acts on his part. 
Such evidence is wholly self-serving insofar ,as showing 
an;~ agreeinent betweent the parties and is admissable 
only to show· perforn1ance on his part in the event the 
specific tern1s of the alleged contract are otherwise 
proved hy clear, convincing and unequivocal testimony. 
The fact is, the evidence shows that Plaintiff and decedent 
were on close personal tenns before 1946, as well as after, 
and that Plaintiff's wife did decedent's washing and de-
cedent consulted Plaintiff on financial n1atters. (Tr. 21, 
29) 
The above acb are entirely consistent with the 
view that l\Ir. Randall hoped to 1naintain the good 
graces of his relativ-e to the end that she would leaYe 
him sorne or all of her property on her death, that he 
devoted some tiine and attention to her personal wants 
in order to influence her in rnaking him the principal 
beneficiary under her Will. There appears to be no 
doubt that 1\Irs. Brereton knew she was bestowing most 
of her property upon l\ir. Randall during a considerable 
period between the tirne of the death of her husband and 
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her own death. But by the smne token the evidence 
demonstrates clearly that she understood she had the 
right to change her Will at any tirne she desired, which 
she did. It is very significant that the testimony shows 
that Plaintiff w.as apparently aware of the changed 
attitude on the part of decedent sorne tirne before her 
death because he discussed it with the witness, Will 
Brereton. (Tr. 67) 
It is Appellant's further contention that before a 
purported or.al agreement n1ay be specifically enforced, 
the law requires that the agreement relate to services 
which are of such a peculiar character that is it impos-
sible to estirnate their value by .any pecuniary standard. 
In the very early Ut.ah case of Brinton v. Van Cott, 
8 Utah 480, 33 P. 218, the Court set out one of,the import-
ant criteria in determining whether an agreement to will 
or leave a party property will be enforced, as follows : 
"When the consideration of the agreement 
consists in work, labor, and services personally 
done and rendered by the Plaintiff, if the value 
of the same can be ascertained with reasonable 
accuracy in an action at law, and adequately com-
pensated by the recovery of damages, then neither 
the services t-hlemselves nor the payment for 
them will avail as a part performance of the 
verbal agreement. But if the services are of such 
a peculiar character that it is impossible to esti-
mate their value by .any pecuiary standard, and it 
is evident that the parties did not intend to meas-
ure them by such standard, then the Plaintiff, 
after the performance of these services could not 
be restored to the situation in which he was 
before, or be compensated by any recovery of 
legal damages." (Italics added)· 
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In Olsen v. Dixon, 165 Minn. 124, 205 N.W. 955, 
the rule is stated thusly: 
"A contract [to devise one's estate] cannot 
be enforced specifically unless the assumption by 
the promisee of the relations of a personal and 
domestic nature is one of the elements of the 
contract. If the services to be performed are not 
those which the promisor may procure from a 
hired servant, and if they consist, in whole or 
in part, of giving to the promisor the companion-
ship and personal attention which are common 
among members of a family living together in 
one household, and which are incapable of meas-
urement by pecuniary standards, specific per-
formance of the contract may be decreed. But, 
if the services might have been rendered by a 
stranger as satisfactorily as by the promisee, and 
the relations of the parties are not of a peculiarly 
personal or domestic nature, the promisee has 
a claim against the promisor for the reasonable 
value of the services, and nothing more." 
In the case Ehling v. Diebert (N.J.) 15 Atl. 2d 655, 
the Plaintiff did not live with the decedent, but worked 
in her butcher shop. He claimed that deceased promised 
hi1n that if he would take c.are of her affairs she would 
leave him everything upon her death. Testin1ony was 
given that he becmne her constant companion, took her 
for rides and spent all his tin1e with her, helped her 
with household duties, and collected rents for her. Plain-
tiff testified that after he 1narried he spent so much tune 
with deceased that it ahnost broke up his 1narriage. The 
Court deter1nined that deceased had paid the Plaintiff 
a salary for his work, and that the personal attention 
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given to decedent was not such as to require specific 
performance of the contract. 
The c.ase of Andrews vs. Aiken, 44 Idaho 797, 260 
P. 423, 69 A.L.R. 14, is likewise illustrative of a situa-
tion in which the claimant performs work of a busines~ 
or household nature not involving such companionship 
and filial responsibility that such services cannot be 
compensated for in money. The duties of Aiken were 
to rent property, collect rents, pay taxes, make settle-
ments with tenants, pay over profits to decedent, and 
other incidental managerial activities. In reviewing the 
cases involved with the problem of enforcing purported 
agreements of the kind presented in the instant case, 
the court held : 
"In practically all the cases where specific 
performance was decreed, the contracts called 
for the performance of duties of a filial and inti-
Inate personal nature, the value of which could 
not be estimated. This, of course, presents an 
entirely different question, and such .authorities 
are not in point in this case. IIere the deceased 
or promisor was not to live in the family of 
the respondent, and no close, intimate, or filial 
relationship was to exist. The contract simply 
required respondent to look after the business of 
the deceased. He was to handle the farms and 
various properties, receive .and disburse moneys, 
and in general act as the business advisor and 
assistant of the owner. He was required to render 
no service that an ordinary real estate agent or 
factor could not and does not perform for his 
clients. This was not a contract for the personal 
care of an aged person where great patience with 
his infirmities was required, contemplating not 
only food, medicine, and clothing, but good tern-
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per, forbearance, and honest effort to please, and 
an intimate family relationship; but was simply 
a business arrangement for the management and 
care of the property of the deceased." 
To the smne effect are the authorities cited in the 
annotation in G9 A.L.R. connnencing at page 145. 
It is also significant that the decedent had house-
keepers and cmnpanions who stayed wjth her in the 
hmne, provided for her personal needs, and gave her 
association and cmnpanionship fron1 day to day. 
The testin1ony of :Jirs. :Jiildred Brereton concerning 
this matter, after she left the home of decedent, is as 
follows: 
"Q. At the tin1e you left her, did she have 
anyone there to look after or help her take care 
of her~ 
"A. I think l\Irs. Celventra was there. 
"Q. Following that tune and up until 1946, 
did she have ladies, from tin1e to time, who lived 
with her on a friendly basis and helped her in 
·the home~ 
"A. She had people that would come in. :Mr. 
and Mrs. Sorensen were there for awhile. They 
1noved up frmu southern Utah. I don't remember 
exactly when. I re1nember when she told us they 
were cmuing and they lived there and took care 
of the house and furnished the groceries and she 
was giving the1n rent free. 
"Q. Over what period of ti1ne was this to 
go on~ 
"A. About two years. 
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"Q. Do you know what years it was 1 
•'A. I think probably from 1944 to 1946. 
"Q. Do you know whether there was anyone 
there st.aying with her in the Fall of 1946 when 
Will Randall came down J 
"A. They were still there, I think. 
"Q. They were still there at that time~ 
"A. During the time he first came down to 
the bank, they were there. 
"Q. Following that time that he moved 
down, in the Fall of 1946, came down to work in 
the bank, until 1950, until her illness in 1950, did 
she have anybody live with her at the time 1 
"A. Off and on she did, I think. 
"Q. And the people that lived with h~n 
were there day after day while they were living 
there, and stayed there at night, didn't they~ 
'A. No, she had a lady that just stayed at 
night, for awhile. 
"Q. But she also had some people that 
stayed during that time or part of the time, 
didn't she '? 
"A. I couldn't tell you exactly when she 
started having them stay in the daytime. 
"Q. Do you recall any more specifically 
as to what the Randalls did, than what these 
other people did for her during this period, Mrs. 
Brereton~ 
"A. Even when the ladies were there, they 
never did the wash or ironing. 
"Q. But they were there and stayed there 
and looked after her in the daytime or the night-
time, isn't that right~ 
31 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"A. They did take care of her. 
"Q. Since 1950 she has had someone there 
all the time, both day and night, hasn't she? 
"A. I think so. 
"Q. Up until the time she died? 
"A. Yes." 
It must be ren1embered that although Plaintiff as-
sisted in finding such companions for decedent they were 
all paid by decedent and not by Plaintiff. And the fact 
that none of these people who personally attended de-
cedent were ever called .as witnesses demonstrates force-
fully that :Jirs. Brereton had never discussed any agree-
ment with thein. Surely, the existence of a specific, un-
equivocal contract would have been communicated to one 
or more of these close companions - if in fact such an 
agreement existed. 
The slight innuendoes relied on by Plaintiff that 
decedent ren1arked on occasions that she had something 
coming from Will Randall, or that he owed it to her, or 
that it was \Vill's job, or that he would be taken care 
of, have less probative value than does the failure of 
the decedent to 1nention any purported agree1nent to her 
various attendants. 
We therefore, respectfully subn1it that the evidence 
. . 
1s insufficient to sustain the burden required of the 
Plaintiff to prove that a specific agreen1ent was entered 
into and that Plaintiff performed the conditions thereof 
required of him. 
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POINT II 
THE PLEADINGS AND EVIDENCE REQUIRE THE 
FINDING THAT ANY SUCH PURPORTED AGREEMENT 
WAS WITHIN THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS AND UNEN-
FORCEABLE. 
Section 25-5-3 U.C.A. 1953, provides: 
"Every contract for the leasing for a longer 
period than one year, or for the sale, of any 
lands, or any interests in lands, shall be void 
unless the contract, or some note or memorandum 
thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by 
whom the lease or s.ale is to be made, or by his 
lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing." 
The contract here claimed by the Plaintiff was to 
the effect that decedent would leave him certain real 
property and bank stock. The fact that the .alleged con-
tract in this case involved not only real property, but 
personal property, does not take it out of the Statute 
of Frauds relating to real property. The law on this 
point is well settled as set forth in 49 A1n. Jur., Statute 
of Frauds, Sec. 216 as follows: 
"Where the agremnent is to devise and 
bequeath both real and personal property and the 
consideration therefor, is entire, as for exmnple 
as entire in its nature, and if oral, the whole 
fails, even though the part relating to the per-
sonalty if standing alone would not have been 
invalidated by the statute. The rule applies not 
only to oral contracts to devise and bequeath 
both realty and personalty, but to agreements by 
which the promisor in general terms leaves all 
of his property to the promisee, and the promisor 
dies leaving both real and personal property: 
such an agreement is deemed to be one for a 
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transfer of an interest in land although the prom-
isor may not have owned any real property at 
the time the agreement was made." 
See also: Grady 'L Faison, 224 N.C. 567, 31 S.E. 2d 
760; Jamerson v. Logan, 228 N.C. 540, 46 S.E. 2d 561; 
15 A.L.R. 2d 1325. 
The fact that the contract here alleged is within 
the Statute of Frauds gives rise to the principle of 
law heretofore enunciated by this court as to the require-
Inents that the contract must be complete and certain 
in its tern1s and n1ust be established by clear, convincing 
and unequivocal evidence. See, Clark r. George, supra. 
As heretofore pointed out, the court will never 
enforce a parole contract to convey property in con-
sideration of personal services ( assun1ing for the pur-
pose of this argument that there was sufficient evidence 
of such an Agreement here) where the services are 
1neasureable in value in monetary terms. See, Brinton 
r. Van Cott, supra; Andreu·s v. Aiken, supra. In all of 
the cases where the court has enforced the agreement 
the party claiining the benefits of the parole contract 
lived with the decedent and was a constant and close 
companion. In the instant case Plaintiff was neither. 
He lived in his own hon1e with his wife and family and 
visited his Aunt when he desired so to do or when asked 
to do so hy decedent. 
This Con rt ha~ had occasion to pass upon the ques-
tion of whether services of the kind rendered by Plain-
tiff and his fa1nily for decedent are capable of being 
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valued in 1noney. In the case of Startin v. Madsen (1951) 
120 Utah 631, 237 P 2d 834, the Plaintiff was seeking 
to recover the reasonable value of service performed 
for decedent. A judgn1ent in favor of the Plaintiff was 
affirmed on appeal by the Supren1e Court which sunl-
marized the facts as follows: 
"James Madsen, brother of plaintiff and 
defendant, died at 88, having been bedridden and 
in need of close personal care for the previous 
six years. His aged wife, Priscilla, was able to 
do some household tasks the fore part of this 
period, but was in need of some care and assis-
tance herself, particularly during the last two 
years when her memory cmnpletely failed her. 
Plaintiff lived about two blocks away. Her hus-
band also was very ill during part of this time, 
and although she had to divide her attention 
between her own home and that of the ~Iadsens, 
she nevertheless prepared 1neals for the ~1adsens, 
first at their home, and later for several years 
at her own home, carrying thein the two blocks 
three times daily. Assisted somewhat by her 
daughter and daughter-in-law, she prepared these 
meals, bought provisions, cleaned the Madsen 
home, washed their clothes and linens, bathed Mr. 
Madsen, changed his bedding, gave him medicine 
when needed, and otherwise provided comfort and 
necessaries principally to Mr. Madsen and par-
tially to Mrs. Madsen. Her services became in-
creasingly burdensome as the Madsens grew 
older. Plaintiff's other brother, defendant herein, 
and his son also assisted the ~Iadsens some." 
The above services were ren<1ered over a period of 
six years (approxiinately 2,190 days). The court, after 
quoting from 58 A1n. J ur. 'Vork .and Labor, Section 63, 
to the effect that a jury n1ay detennine the reasonable 
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value of labor perforn1ed upon request without a specific 
contract therefor, even though there is no evidence of 
the value of such labor, went on to say: 
"This rule would apply to the type of work 
the plaintiff did. The term "practical nurse" is 
just another name for ordinary housekeeping and 
the personal care and attention which everyone 
gives to sick people in their own homes; that 
is, to prepare the meals, feed, bathe, clothe, 
change their clothing and their bedding and 
attend to their needs. There is nothing particu-
larly technical nor pofessional .about it. Every 
person of ordinary intelligence and understanding 
knows what that work consists of and has some 
idea to its value." 
In another case, Burton v. McLaughlin, (1950) 117 
Utah 483, 217 Pac 2d 566, this Court .affirn1ed an award 
against the Estate of Patrick Henry ~fcLaughlin for 
services rendered including cooking, mending, house-
keeping, running errands, and looking after the personal 
needs of decedent when he was sick. 
See, also, H ols.z L'. Stephen, 362 Ill. 527, 200 N .E. 
601, 106 A.L.R. 737. There the Illinois Supreme Court 
announced the rule to be : 
"Even where the tenus of the contract are 
clear, certain, and unan1biguous, specific perform-
ance is not a n1atter of right, but rests in the 
sound discretion of the court to be determined 
frmn all the facts and circu1nstances. Edwards 
v. Brown, 308 Ill. 350, 139 N.E. 618. The re1nedy 
is afforded where the contract has been per-
formed by one party in such a way that the 
parties c.annot be placed in. statu quo or da1nages 
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awarded which would be full compensation. vVeir 
v. Weir, 287 Ill. 495, 122 N.E. 868; Koenig v. 
Dohm, 209 Ill. 468, 70 N.E. 1061. The perform-
ance relied upon must place the party who has 
performed in such a situation that it would be 
a fraud upon him if the agreement were not car-
ried out. Nelson v. Nelson, 334 Ill. 43, 165 N.E. 
159. To take an or.al promise which has been 
partly performed out of the statute, part per-
formance must be such that a restoration of their 
previous condition is impracticable and a refusal 
to go on and complete the engagement would be 
a virtu.al fraud upon the parties. Shraver v. 
Wickwire, 335 Ill. 46, 166 N.E. 458; Stephens 
v. Collison, 313 Ill. 365, 145 N.E. 81. The perform-
ance of personal services, the value of which may 
be estimated in money, or for which a recovery 
may be had at law, will not take the contract 
out of the statute, because the law affords .an 
adequate remedy. 
The evidence in this case would dearly dmnonstrate 
that the services rendered by ~Ir. J. vYill Randall, the 
Plaintiff, as well as by me1nbers of his family, could be, 
and were during her life time compens.ated for by dece-
dent in money or property. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN CERTAIN RULINGS ON THE 
EVIDENCE. 
It was and is Appellant's position in this case that 
Plaintiff cmne to Provo to ·work in the bank because 
such change of position iminediately increased his 
income, and that over the years Plaintiff w.as adequately 
paid and cmnpensated for any services which he 1nay 
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have rendered to the decedent. In the first place, although 
Respondent claims he g.ave up his business in Ogden 
and moved to Provo as a p.art of a purported agree-
ment between Plaintiff and decedent, the evidence shows 
that he did not give up any business but continued to 
own the smne interest in the Pioneer Coal and Lumber 
Company at Ogden and still n1aintains his position as 
President. (Tr. 69) 
On cross exmnination counsel atten1pted to inter-
rogate the witness I~ay Randall with respect to the 
salary and incon1e his father received in Ogden as cOin-
pared to the salar~· and income he received on accepting 
a position with the State B.ank of Provo. Although coun-
sel explained Appellant's position to the Court, the 
Court refused to allow any testimony on the matter. 
( Tr. 96, 97). Certainly such evidence was admissable 
to negative the clailn of Plaintiff that he went to Provo 
because of an .alleged agreetnent when the change in 
financial position 1nay well have been such as to have 
explained the reason for his move. 
The Court did allow testilnony to the effect that 
during the years, both before and after Plaintiff left 
Ogden and r.a1ne to Provo, decedent gave hun various 
ite1ns of property. including 1200 shares of lTtah Ti1nber 
nnd Coal C01npany stock, real property located in Los 
Angeles of a Yalue of between $1,500 and $2,000, and 
20 shares of stock in the State Bank of Provo. (Tr. 98, 
99). The value of the foregoing property· is indicated 
by the prob.ate file in the Matter of the Estate of 
Sarah P. Randall Brereton, Deceased, (Probate No. 
38 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10915) which was introduced in evidence at the trial. 
The Inventory and Apprais1nent shows the lJtah Timber 
and Coal Con1pany stock to be of the approximate v.alue 
of $8,400.00, and the 20 shares of stock in the State 
Bank of Provo to be of the approximate value of 
$6,440.00, making in excess of $16,340.00 received by 
Plaintiff from decedent. 
In addition to the property which decedent gave 
to Plaintiff, l(ay Randall testified that she had given 
him $100 on one occasion and 200 shares of Timber 
and Coal stock on another occasion. 
If the court had permitted counsel to inquire into 
the salary received by Mr. Randall upon his coming to 
Provo and thereafter, the evidence would have demon-
strated clearly the reason behind the move, as well as 
the reason behind the attentions paid by Plaintiff to 
decedent. Such evidence also explains why Mrs. Brereton 
on occasion may have stated that, "She had it coming," 
or that "Will owed it to her," or such other similar 
comments. 
Claim is also made by Appellant that the trial 
court improperly admitted the testimony of Clyde Sand-
gren, an attorney-at-law, who testified concerning certain 
conversations he had with the decedent. 
On Voir Dire examination prior to giving testimony 
of the conversations, ~lr. Sandgren testified as follows: 
"Q. And your conversation with ~irs. Brere-
ton, on this occasion as well as on other occasions, 
was in a matter of business, wasn't it 1 
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"A. Yes. 
"Q. She owned the controlling interest in 
the bank and she was the one that was obtaining 
your legal advice in respect to what should be 
done relative to this stock, isn't that correct~ 
"A. Yes, she sought my advice with respect 
to it. (Tr. 72, 73) 
"Q. Your occasion for being over at her 
home was that she called you over there to dis-
cuss this matter you were working on for the 
bank, is that not right~ 
"A. Well, it was to discuss with me the 
disposition of her stock in the bank, that's right. 
"Q. She called you over for the purpose, to 
discuss with you the disposition of her stock 
in the bank~ 
"A. Broadly speaking, that would be true. 
"Q. And you recognize her at that time as 
being the president and the one who held the 
controlling interest in the bank~ 
"A. Yes, I knew she was president and that 
she held controlling interest. 
"Q. And you were aware, in her discussion 
with you, that she wanted to seek your advice 
and to have your advice here with reference to 
her stock in the bank¥ 
"A. Yes, I think I would have to say yes 
to that. (Tr. 76) 
"Q. Didn't the nature of vour work with 
Mrs. Brereton relate to her di~position of her 
stock in the bank? 
"A. Yes. 
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"Q. From the very first time you saw her, 
including .all the transactions you had with her 1 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And in connection with that very first 
conversation, you realized she was discussing 
this matter with you in terms of obtaining your 
advice and counsel as an attorney~ 
"A. vVould you mind repeating the ques-
tion 1 
(Last question read.) 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And you realized that, in her c.alling 
you over there, that she was seeking to get your 
professional advice 1 
"A. Yes. (Tr. 77, 78) 
"Q. But you never told her you were not 
going to bill her for these other services, did 
you~ 
"A. No. 
"Q. You never told her you weren't going 
to represent her in connection with these other 
matters she had talked to you about~ 
"A. No." (Tr. 79) 
Our Statute, Section 78-24-8 (2), U.C.A. 1953, pro-
vides: 
"An attorney cannot, without the consent of 
his client, be examined as to any communication 
made by the client to him, or his advice given 
therein, in the course of professional employ-
ment." 
The case of City and County of San Francisco v. 
Fhtperior Co1trt, 31 Cal. 2d 227, 231 Pac. 2d 26, 25 A.L.R. 
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2d 1418, discusses the privileges of the attorney-client 
relationship and states the grounds therefore as follows: 
"The privilege is given on grounds of public 
policy in the belief that the benefits derived there-
from justify the risk that unjust decisions may 
sometimes result from the suppression of relevant 
evidence. Adequate legal representation in the 
.ascertainment and enforcement of rights or the 
prosecution or defense of litigation compels a full 
disclosure of the facts by the client to his attor-
ney. 'Unless he makes known to the lawyer all 
the facts, the advice which follows will be use-
less, if not misleading; the lawsuit will be con-
ducted along improper lines, the trial will be full 
of suprises, much useless litigation may result. 
Thirdly, unless the client knows that his lawyer 
cannot be compelled to reveal what is told him, 
the client will suppress what he thinks to be 
unfavorable facts.' Morgan, Foreword, Am. Law. 
Inst. Code of Evidence, pp. 25-26. Given the 
privilege, a client may make such a disclosure 
without fear that his attorney 1nay be forced to 
reveal the information confided to him. 'The 
absence of the privilege would convert the attor-
ney habitually and inevitably into a mere infor-
Iner for the benefit of the opponent.' 8 Wign1ore 
supra, Sec. 2380a, p. 813." 
This same view was upheld by this Court in the 
case of Burton v. JJ,f cLaughlin, supra. See, also, :Mangan's 
vVill, 185 Wis. 328, 200 N.W. 386; Collins v. Collins, 110 
Ohio St. 105, 143 N.E. 561; In Re Bayer, 116 Neb. 670, 
218 N.W. 746. 
According to the testhnony of l\1r. Sangren all of 
the convers.ations he had ·with decedent were in con-
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nection with her seeking legal advice frmn hiin as to 
the disposition of her property by Will. We therefore 
sub1nit that his testi1nony as to such conversations was 
unad1nissible. This would not make unadmissible the 
letter (Exhibit .. A.) sent to Tracy-Collins Trust Company 
which letter on its face indicates that Mrs. Brereton at 
that tilne desired to leave to the Plaintiff a sufficient 
amount of stock to give him control of the bank and 
asked ~Ir. Newell B. Dayton, Vice-President of Tracy-
Collins Trust Company if her Will so provided. If Mrs. 
Brereton had previously made an agreement to leave 
Plaintiff such bank stock (and had performed such .agree-
ment by making a third codicil to her Will in the spring 
of 1946), there was certainly no reason for her to write 
Exhibit A. 
The trial court by its ruling as well as its com1nents 
(Tr. 74, 75), and also the jury, apparently gave con-
siderable weight to the testimony of l\Ir. Sandgren as 
to his conversations with decedent which were inadmis-
sible. 
POINT IV· 
THE COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING THE MATTER 
TO THE JURY AND IN FOLLOWING ITS DETERMINATION 
OF THE FACTS. 
It is Appellant's position in respect to this point 
first that the court should not have tried the 1natter 
to a jury. Defendant made a motion to strike the cause 
from the jury calendar for the reason that the matter 
was not one in connection with which the Plaintiff had 
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a right to trial by jury and the court would be in a 
much better position to determine the facts than a jury 
which was denied. (R. 9) 
Counsel is of the opinion that the trial court desired 
to avoid determining the sufficiency of the facts and 
for that reason placed the responsibility upon the jury 
well knowing that the evidence, such as it may be, would 
be uncontradicted because there would be no one avail-
able to testify contrary to 'vhat might be testified to by 
Plaintiff's witnesses. The very nature of a case such 
as the one now before the court is such that dispute in 
the evidence is rarely possible. Persons having contact 
with the decedent may testify with respect to conversa-
tions which they purportedly had, but neither the deced-
ent nor any third person can come in and dispute the fact 
that such conversations took place. Thus, the only pur-
pose served by having a jury would be to see if the nature 
of the evidence introduced by the Plaintiff would be such 
as to influence the jurors to recognize Plaintiff's claim. 
Obviously after the jury has returned its verdict, the 
court is in a strong position to find in favor of the 
Plaintiff notwithstandmg the legal insufficiency of the 
evidence. By such a method little effect, if any at all, 
is given to the rule of law requiring the clain1ant to 
prove by clear, convincing and unequivocal testiinony, 
not only that an agreement was 1nade but the specific 
terms thereof. 
Responsibility of the trial court in this case fairly 
and impartially to hear and determine the n1atter could 
not be delegated to a jury in order to give additional 
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'veight or support to the claims of the Plaintiff by a 
SYJ.npathetic verdict in Plaintiff's favor. 
Appellant further contends that the case should not 
have been submitted to the jury because the evidence 
was insufficient. Counsel made appropriate requests for 
a directed verdict but the same were denied. (R. 24, 
25). If, however, this court should find that there was 
some evidence to go to the jury, then the trial court 
should have submitted it to them upon proper instruc-
tions. 
Although counsel requested the court to instruct the 
jury that the burden was upon the Plaintiff to prove 
the specific terms of the contract by "clear, convincing 
and unequivocal testimony" the court refused so to do, 
stating merely in Instruction No. 2 that the proof should 
be "clear and convincing." (R. 15) As originally drafted, 
this instruction used the phrase "clear, positive and 
unequivocal"; but the court changed its mind about the 
matter before submitting it to the jury and instructed 
then1 .as above indicated. (R. 15) Likewise, the court 
instructed the jury in Instruction No. 2, that it was 
necessary to find that the terms of the contract were 
"substantially" as set forth. (R. 15) Exception was taken 
to this instruction by the Defendant, (Tr. 144) and 
apparently some time since the case was decided some-
one has drawn a line through the word "substantially" 
in the instruction. (R. 15) 
In view of the repeated declarations by this Court 
of the quantum and quality of proof necessary to esta-
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blish an oral agreement to convey real property by a 
decedent, we submit that the foregoing instructions not 
only misled the jury but likewise the trial court in 
reaching its decision. 
Defendant further requested the court to instruct the 
jury that the law "jealously guards and protects the 
right of an individual to dispose of his or her property 
after her death as such person may desire, and it is 
riot for you or the Court to pass judgment upon the 
decedent in this case as to whether she has wisely or 
equitably disposed of her property by her last Codicil 
to her \Viii and Testament. How you or I may have 
disposed of our property under circumstances of this 
case is entirely immaterial. 
You may, however, consider the terms and conditions 
of her Will and the various codicils thereto, in determ-
ining whether or not decedent had entered into a contract 
with Plaintiff as claimed by him." (R. 30) Again we 
submit that this instruction was proper and the subject 
matter thereof should have been taken into consideration 
by both the court and jury in arriving at any decision 
in this case. 
The effect of the court's instructions was to impress 
the jury that if there· was any evidence to support a 
finding in favor of Plaintiff they should do so. The 
Court apparently adopted this same theory in reaching 
its decision after the jury's verdict was returned. For 
instance, Instruction No. 3, excepted to by Defendant, 
Tr. 114), .advises the jury that an oral agreement "is 
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as binding upon the parties as a written agreement 
when such agreement has been established to the extent 
that it is required by the law," without at that time 
advising the jury as to the burden which the Plaintiff 
had to establish such contract and further without giving 
the jury the benefit of Defendant's Requested Instruc-
tions Nos. 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8. 
It appears to Appellant that the trial court did not 
follow the law, either in its instructions to the jury or 
in considering the matter subsequent to the verdict. 
CONCLUSION 
By way of summary Appellant respectfully urges: 
1. The Plaintiff failed to allege .and prove by clear, 
convincing, and unequivocal evidence that any contract 
as claimed existed between him and the decedent. 
2. The evidence is insufficient to show that Plain-
tiff performed any contract justifying the court in 
ordering specific perfor1nance. 
3. The evidence shows that any service perfonned 
by the Plaintiff were, or could . be, compensated for in 
1noney so that specific performance in aily event should 
be denied. 
4. The court erred in its ruling on the evidence, 
which if properly determined, would have required a 
verdict for the Defendant in this matter. 
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5. The court erred in submitting the matter to 
the jury and in the instructions which it gave upon the 
issues. 
6. Subsequently, in following the verdict of the 
jury and in giving effect to the errors committed in its 
instructions, the court ilnproperly entered Judgment for 
the Plaintiff and against the Defendant. 
In urging this Court to reverse the trial court, we 
desire to adopt the language of the text appearing in 
69 A.L.R. at page 167, as follows : 
"It has been remarked that contracts of the 
character in question have become so frequent in 
recent years as to cause alarm, and the courts 
have grown conserv.ative as to the nature of the 
evidence required to establish them, and as to 
enforcing them when established. Also, that cases 
of this character are inherently easy to prove and 
hard to combat,-a characteristic that should not 
impair the .action when proved, but which should 
cause the court to proceed with caution. And the 
view has been expressed that, when such a con-
tract is 1nade the basis of an action, the evidence 
in support of it should be looked upon with great 
jealousy, and weighed in the Inost scrupulous 
manner. The character, conduct, and testimony 
of the witnesses should be as to inspire confidence 
th.at they are telling the truth. Such a contract 
can be enforced only when it is clearly proved 
by direct and positive testiinony and its tern1s 
are definite and certain. 
"''There a decree for the specific enforce-
ment of a contract to will all of the owner's 
property to another will have the result of 
rendering ineffectual the prmnisor's will, and pass 
48 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to the promisee the title to all the property left 
by him at his decease, subject only to the claims 
made thereto by law for the widow, justification 
for such judgment can only be found in a contract 
fully executed by the promisee, definite and cer-
tain in every essential, and made to appear by 
clear and convincing proof. If, therefore, the 
proof submitted does not bring the case within 
the rule requiring execution of the contract, the 
p.arties will be left to their redress at law." 
Respectfully Submitted, 
ARTHUR H. NIELSEN 
510 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
WENDELL B. HAMMOND 
Bountiful, Utah 
GEORGE FADEL 
Bountiful, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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